Introduction
A number of theorists hold that literal, linguistic meaning is determined by the cognitive mechanism that underpins semantic competence. Let us call this view the cognitivist account of meaning (or simply cognitivism). In this paper, I discuss a surprisingly serious difficulty that cognitivism faces in light of the liar paradox.
My focus is on the form of cognitivism developed extensively by, for example, Emma Borg (2004 and Richard Larson and Gabriel Segal (1995) . Such authors build into cognitivism a particular view about semantic competence: that it is underpinned by the speaker's cognition of a truth-conditional semantic theory, of the general form advocated by Davidson (1967) . Such a semantic theory is a recursively axiomatised formal theory that contains axioms assigning semantic values to each lexical item of the object language and axioms assigning semantic values to complex expressions on the basis of their constituents and mode of composition. For each sentence, X, of the object language, the semantic theory yields a T-sentence, a theorem of the form "X is true if, and only if, p". 1 I shall say that a T-sentence is correct if the sentence replacing "p" states the condition under which X is true; it follows that a correct T-sentence is true. For ease, I shall hereafter reserve the term "semantic theory" for semantic theories of this general form; and I shall say that such a semantic theory is correct just in case its axioms are true and it yields only correct T-sentences.
It is contentious exactly what cognition of a semantic theory amounts to. However, one way or another, to say that a speaker cognises a semantic theory is to make a substantive, empirical claim about the cognitive mechanisms that underpin her semantic competence. The rough idea is that speakers possess a modular language faculty that includes a dedicated semantic module, and that a given speaker cognises a semantic theory T just in case her semantic module realises, encodes, processes, or stands in some other suitable relation to, T. Whatever the details, there is no presumption that cognition is factive: to say that a speaker cognises T is not thereby to say that T is true. Let us call this view of semantic competence the neo-Davidsonian account of semantic competence. For Borg, and Larson and Segal, this cognitive mechanism determines linguistic meaning: the cognised semantic theory is correct.
2 I shall argue that, so understood, cognitivism faces a surprisingly serious difficulty in light of the liar paradox. Consider the liar sentence λ:
λ is not true.
Without loss of generality, we can treat λ as a sentence of English -perhaps, for example, by treating the letter "λ" as an abbreviation of the definite description:
the first centrally aligned sentence in the paper "the cognitivist account of meaning and the liar paradox".
Intuitively, λ is a subject-predicate sentence whose subject denotes λ, and whose predicate is satisfied by whatever is not true. As such, we might initially expect the following to be the T-sentence for λ:
(T λ ) "λ is not true" is true if, and only if, λ is not true.
However, (T λ ) implies a contradiction (by substitution of co-referring terms and by considering cases). So, on pain of inconsistency, it seems that (T λ ) must be rejected.
The potential difficulty for the cognitivist is clear. If it turns out that speakers cognise a semantic theory that has the T-sentence (T λ ) amongst its theorems, then the cognitivist would seem to be committed to (T λ ) being correct. That is, the cognitivist would seem to be committed to (T λ ) being true. Given that (T λ ) is inconsistent, this would be a serious problem.
Once I have said a little more about the cognitivist account of meaning ( §2), I shall provide ( §3) an argument for the claim that, assuming the neo-Davidsonian account of semantic competence, ordinary speakers do cognise a semantic theory that includes (T λ ) amongst its theorems. I shall then ( §4) discuss a number of lines of response, drawing out some of the difficulties facing each response, before concluding ( §5).
It should be made clear before we begin that the difficulty cannot simply be brushed aside.
First, it will not do for the cognitivist to simply reject the neo-Davidsonian account of semantic competence. The account is at the heart of perhaps the most extensively worked out form of cognitivism -that of Borg, and Larson and Segal -, and it would be a major, and highly unwelcome, concession to admit that this form of cognitivism is inconsistent. Moreover, it is not clear to me that the concession would be methodologically sound: it is an empirical question about our cognitive make-up whether the neo-Davidsonian account of semantic competence is correct, and we should not reject it just because it might not be straightforwardly combined with an account of linguistic meaning. Of course, there may be independent reasons to deny the neo-Davidsonian account of 3 semantic competence. 2 I do not think, however, that empirical accounts of the cognitive mechanisms that underpin semantic competence draw evidential support from their facilitating a solution to the liar paradox; so we should not reject such an account on the basis of the paradox.
Second, it is a purely empirical matter what the theorems of the cognised semantic theory are.
And, in particular, it is a purely empirical matter whether a cognised semantic theory has (T λ ) amongst its theorems. If a cognised semantic theory is to do real explanatory work, it may not simply be stipulated that it, say, encodes a solution to the liar paradox. A theorist's preferred solution to the paradox may not simply be 'read back' into the cognitive mechanism that underpins semantic competence.
Third, the discussion here is likely to generalise. It is the particular way that the cognitivist ties linguistic meaning to the cognitive mechanism underlying some of our linguistic dispositions that causes difficulties in relation to the liar paradox. But there are other accounts of meaning that tie meaning to linguistic dispositions, such as views that ground meaning in speakers' dispositional states (e.g. Field 1977) , speakers' causal states (e.g. Davies 1987 , Evans 1981 , and some hypothetical process of radical interpretation (e.g. Davidson 1973) . If the liar paradox poses a serious difficulty to cognitivism, then it likewise poses a serious difficulty to a whole range of empirically-minded accounts of meaning. It is worth getting clear on the full extent of the difficulty posed by the liar paradox to cognitivism.
Background and terminology
Let me begin by clarifying a few terms. First, a speaker's semantic competence is her idealised capacity to interpret each of the lexical items, complex expressions and sentences of her language. There is an ambiguity here to note. Consider the claim that the cognitive mechanism that underpins semantic competence determines meaning. Is this a metaphysical notion of determination?
That is, does the cognitivist claim that the cognitive mechanism that underpins semantic competence metaphysically determines, or grounds, linguistic meaning? Cognitivists sometimes seem to suggest so. For one example, Borg states that:
[w]hat makes "grass is green" mean that grass is green is that this is the content delivered by the semantic theory contained within a subject's language faculty; grounding is thus achieved by appeal to contents of the mind. (2010: 35, my emphasis) 6 If we understand determination with this metaphysical flavour, then we obtain a version of cognitivism along the following lines.
Metaphysical cognitivism: the cognised semantic theory is correct, and it is correct in virtue of its being cognised.
However, there is no requirement to understand determination in this way. For example, when we say that a calculator 'determines' the correct answer to a sum, we certainly do not suggest that the correctness of the answer is grounded by the contents of the calculator. Rather, we suggest just that the calculator gets the answer right. If we understand determination in this way, then we obtain a weaker version of cognitivism, as follows.
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Material cognitivism: the cognised semantic theory is correct.
So, to be explicit, metaphysical cognitivism implies material cognitivism, but the converse is not true.
We shall find the distinction useful from time to time in what follows -but I shall use "cognitivism" when the distinction is not important. Alternatively, the cognitivist might deny that facts about meaning can be directly read off the cognised semantic theory because she denies that linguistic meaning is truth-conditional. Perhaps, for example, she could argue that linguistic meaning is not representational, or that it requires substantial input from context to obtain truth conditions. 7 It is an interesting and important question whether the considerations I raise in the present paper extend to such views, but not one I shall consider here. For the moment I merely note that the problem with such an approach is that we are assuming the neoDavidsonian account of semantic competence; and the view that meaning is determined by the cognition of a (truth-conditional) semantic theory seems in tension with the claim that meaning is not truth-conditional. First, the view would be rather incongruous: our semantic competence would involve the assignment of truth conditions to sentences, even though the meaning thereby determined would not be truth-conditional. Second, it is simply unclear how the (sometimes incorrect) assignment of truth conditions to sentences made by the cognised theory could determine such non-truthconditional meanings. Once the cognitive mechanism has assigned a truth condition to a sentence, it is unclear how to get back something other than a truth condition. For these reasons, I shall assume throughout this paper that sentence meaning is truth-conditional.
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There is a second strategy for denying that the cognised semantic theory needs to be correct.
Consider how, on some readings of Davidson, a (truth-conditional) 
The liar paradox and the inconsistency hypothesis
Pre-reflectively, we might expect the truth condition for λ -where λ is the sentence "λ is not true" -to be represented by (T λ ), reprinted here for ease of reference:
However, (T λ ) is inconsistent (by substitution of co-referring terms and by considering cases), and should presumably thus be rejected.
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Consider now what the inconsistency of (T λ ) tells us about correct semantic theories. As (T λ ) is inconsistent, it cannot accurately represent the truth condition actually possessed by λ (if, indeed, λ possesses any truth condition at all). So (T λ ) cannot be yielded by any correct semantic theory, as correct semantic theories are true. Can a similar point be made with regard to cognised semantic theories? No. Whereas correct semantic theories need to be true, a cognised semantic theory needs just to play the relevant role in an empirical story about a speaker's cognitive make-up. And there is no a priori reason to suppose that the relevant role must be played by a consistent semantic theory. 7 So, (T λ ) can be yielded by a cognised semantic theory. And, as we have seen, contrary to cognitivism, such a semantic theory would not be correct.
I shall shortly raise an argument for the hypothesis that, in fact, cognised semantic theories do yield such T-sentences as (T λ ). More precisely, I shall raise an argument for the inconsistency hypothesis, as follows.
The inconsistency hypothesis: the cognised semantic theory is inconsistent, as it yields an inconsistent T-sentence (such as (T λ )) for a liar sentence (such as λ).
13,14
If the inconsistency hypothesis is true, then cognitivism -at least as characterised above -is false. I consider a number of lines of response to the difficulty in the following section. 14 In saying the cognised theory is inconsistent I do not insist that the theory yields an explicit contradiction; I allow that an additional true premise (such as: λ = "λ is not true") might also be required.
8
The idea, then, is that the T-sentences of the cognised semantic are expected to correspond reasonably well to the intuitive conception of literal meaning. As such, from the current perspective, we might hope to use linguistic data to formulate direct hypotheses about which T-sentences are yielded by the cognised semantic theory. Now, a full discussion of the linguistic data is beyond the scope of this paper; but we can nonetheless build at least a prima facie case in support of the inconsistency hypothesis. Consider the following four pieces of linguistic data.
First, consider the following, intuitively valid inference.
(1) λ is not true.
(2) "Grass is blue" is not true.
(3) The liar sentence and "Grass is blue" are distinct sentences.
Therefore:
(4) There are at least two sentences that are not true.
The intuitive validity of the inference from (1)- (3) to (4) rests on the fact that it is apparently an instance of the valid argument form:
(3′) a and b are distinct Gs.
(4′) There are at least two Gs that are not F.
If this is right, then, on its natural reading, it seems that premise (1) has truth-conditional content of the form of (1′) -and thus, plausibly, content of the form of that λ is not true.
Second, liar sentences can be embedded within logical operators to yield intuitively true sentences. To set up the example, note that we can characterise the 'revenge problem' as a problem facing potential solutions to the liar paradox that do not imply that λ is true: the problem is that such solutions lead naturally to the meta-theoretic assertion of "λ is not true", seemingly implying that "λ is not true" is true after all. Consider now the following.
(5) If λ is not true, then an adequate solution to the liar paradox will have to resolve the 'revenge problem'.
Sentence (5) is, I think, intuitively true: a prima facie 'revenge problem' will arise for any solution that, as apparently expressed by the antecedent, deems λ untrue. As such, on the intuitive reading of (5), it seems that the antecedent of (5) has truth-conditional content that λ is not true.
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Third, it seems that, when liar sentences are uttered, there is non-cancellable content.
Suppose, for example, that Sara is teaching a course on the paradoxes and has written just the following on the whiteboard:
The sentence on the whiteboard is not true.
(Note that this is obtained by taking "λ" to be an abbreviation of "the sentence on the whiteboard".)
Suppose that Sara says that, in her opinion, the sentence on the whiteboard is not true; this results in a student asking whether the sentence on the whiteboard needs to be learnt for the exam. Suppose that Sara responds by uttering (6).
(6) The sentence on the whiteboard is not true.
Plausibly, by uttering (6) in this context, Sara conveys that the sentence need not be learnt for the exam. Suppose now that she continues by uttering one of the following.
(7) … but you still need to learn it for the exam.
(8) … and it's not the case that the sentence on the whiteboard is not true.
Intuitively, Sara would not contradict her utterance of (6) in uttering (7), but she would contradict her utterance of (6) Borg (2012: 31-32 ) is critical of using such tests for establishing context sensitivity; failing the tests, however, plausibly remains good evidence for the absence of context sensitivity.
Then, bypassing any complications involving tense, Mike's utterance of (9) and John's utterance of (10) can intuitively be reported correctly (in our context) as follows.
(11) Mike and John said that what Mike said at t was not true.
(12) Mike and John agree that what Mike said at t was not true.
Given the robustness of the intuition that reports such as (11) and (12) are correct (the reader is invited to test further cases), this is initial evidence that, on the natural readings of such liar sentences, there is no context sensitivity.
The above data constitutes initial evidence that speakers are disposed to assign to λ the literal, context-insensitive, truth-conditional content that λ is not true. And, in the present context, it constitutes initial evidence that the cognised semantic theory yields the T-sentence (T λ ) -and that the inconsistency hypothesis is thereby correct. The data provided here is certainly not conclusive: our linguistic intuitions are underpinned by a variety of interlinked cognitive mechanisms, and it is far from being clear cut precisely what a particular set of data tells us about those mechanisms. This being said, however, it is very natural to interpret the above data as supporting the inconsistency hypothesis -and insofar as this is case, they provide some reason to think -albeit tentatively -that the inconsistency hypothesis is correct.
That, then, is the difficulty posed to the cognitivist account of meaning by the liar paradox.
Cognitivism states that the cognised semantic theory is correct; but there is reason to think that, as a result of the liar paradox, the cognised semantic theory is inconsistent. As correctness implies truth, the inconsistency of the cognised semantic theory directly contradicts cognitivism.
Lines of response
Let us now turn to discuss a number of lines that the cognitivist might take in response to the difficulty posed by the liar paradox. To help keep the dialectic clear, the lines of response are divided into two main groups, according to whether they deny the inconsistency hypothesis, or deny that the truth of the inconsistency hypothesis would be a problem for cognitivism.
"The inconsistency hypothesis is false"
In this subsection, I discuss three lines of response. The first is that the inconsistency hypothesis must be false for the neo-Davidsonian account of semantic competence to make sense. The second is that, the argument in the previous section notwithstanding, the cognised semantic theory is consistent. In particular, I shall consider the hypothesis that, in line with a well-known solution to the liar paradox offered by Tyler Burge (1979) , the natural language truth predicate is an indexical. The third line of response I consider is more radical: that the cognised semantic theory may indeed yield a T-sentence like (T λ ), but revisions to logic and the semantics of conditionals block the derivation of a contradiction.
First, then, the cognitivist might initially be tempted to argue that the inconsistency hypothesis must be false: the neo-Davidsonian account of semantic competence, she might claim, requires the cognised semantic theory to be consistent. Perhaps, so goes the thought, if an individual were to cognise an inconsistent semantic theory, then her semantic module would have to implement a 'faulty program', leading to the failure of the semantic module to operate effectively. Arguments along these lines, however, are unlikely to succeed.
An account of semantic competence must explain how a speaker's cognitive make-up is such It is not the case, then, that the cognised semantic theory must be consistent. The second line of response that I shall consider, however, says that the cognised semantic theory, regardless of the above, is consistent. To push this line, the cognitivist would have to do two things: first, she would 12 have to cast doubt on the argument for the inconsistency hypothesis presented in §3; second, she would have to present contrary data -or a contrary interpretation of the same data -to support the conclusion that cognised semantic theory is consistent.
Let us fix the idea with a concrete example (although, to be clear, the difficulties I shall subsequently raise do generalise). Suppose, then, that the cognitivist proceeds by seeking evidence that the natural language truth predicate is in fact an indexical, as proposed by Burge (1979) . 17 She might then argue that the tests for context sensitivity employed in §3 failed to indicate this indexicality because the relevant context parameter has the same value in each of the contexts of utterance for (9)- (12). Then she could conclude that the T-sentence for λ yielded by the cognised semantic theory is:
(T λ ′) "λ is not true" (as uttered in c) is TRUE if, and only if, λ is not true-in-c
where the capitalised truth predicate is given a context-insensitive reading. So long as there is no value of c for which, in c, λ falls in the extension of "true-in-c", contradiction is avoided.
I am not sure how likely it is that the cognitivist will find strong evidence to support the hypothesis that the cognised semantic theory yields (T λ ′). There is certainly no obvious reason why the cognised semantic theory would treat the natural language truth predicate as context sensitive: the expressive function of the truth predicate appears not to require it to be context sensitive. What is the expressive function of the truth predicate? Arguably, it is to facilitate blind assertion ("whatever your mother just told you, it's true"), infinite generalisation ("everything the Oracle says is true"), agreement ("yes, that's true"), anaphora ("Cameron is the prime minister. True, but …"), etc. 18 All of these functions, however, are most simply achieved by allowing sentences of the form "…" and "'…'
is true" to be straightforwardly intersubstitutable, salva veritate, in transparent contexts -which would indicate that the natural language truth predicate is context insensitive. And, on the assumption that we would expect our cognitive mechanisms to tend towards a minimisation of spurious inefficiency, we should thus expect the cognised semantic theory to treat the truth predicate as context insensitive.
But suppose that, nonetheless, the cognitivist does find evidence that the cognised semantic theory yields (T λ ′). Even then, it seems that it very easily could have been the case that we had cognised a semantic theory that yields (T λ ). Our linguistic behaviour need not have been different in 17 There are other views in the literature according to which the liar paradox arises due to context sensitivity, but that do not treat the truth predicate as an indexical. For reasons of space, I cannot discuss them here. See e.g. Glanzberg 2001 , and Parsons 1974 Cf. the literature on deflationary theories of truth, e.g. Horwich 2010 . (Note that one can accept the above comments without being a deflationist.) 13 any relevant respect, and there need have been no substantial difference between the the cognitive mechanisms underlying that behaviour; but there could have been a small difference in the details of our neurological wiring, so to speak, such that the cognised semantic theory had yielded (T λ ) and such that our pragmatic mechanisms had been slightly adjusted to compensate for the difference. There would then be two worlds -w 1 and w 2 , say -such that: the linguistic behaviour of the people in each world would be the same in the relevant respects; 19 the kind of cognitive mechanisms that underpin the linguistic behaviour would be the same in each world; and the speakers in w 1 just happen to cognise a consistent semantic theory, whereas the speakers in w 2 just happen to cognise an inconsistent semantic theory. While one may claim that cognitivism is true in w 1 , one may not claim that cognitivism is true in w 2 . 20 This, however, is a problem.
Let me explain. Take the metaphysical variant of cognitivism first. Suppose that the metaphysical cognitivist claims that, in w 1 , the cognised semantic theory, in virtue of its being cognised, is correct. What can she say about linguistic meaning in w 2 ? Given that the linguistic behaviour of people in w 1 and w 2 is in the relevant respects the same, and given that the linguistic behaviour is underpinned by just the same kind of cognitive mechanisms, we would not like to conclude that linguistic expressions in w 2 are meaningless. But, as the metaphysical cognitivist's metaphysical story is only available in w 1 , she would thus be committed to there being a different metaphysical story in w 2 . This, however, would be a bizarre situation: speakers' linguistic behaviour, the kind of mechanisms that underpin that behaviour, the external environment, the laws of nature, etc., may be the same in w 1 as in w 2 , but the fundamental metaphysical picture of meaning in the two worlds would be different. But what could justify this difference? The metaphysical cognitivist would owe us an explanation, and it is not clear how one would be given.
Consider now material cognitivism. 21 It might be claimed that material cognitivism is true in w 1 , but false in w 2 . Moreover, the material cognitivist may grant that a single (non-cognitivist) metaphysical story may be told about meaning in both w 1 and w 2 . However, now we would like to ask the material cognitivist: why is the metaphysics of meaning such that, in w 1 but not w 2 , the cognitive mechanisms that underpin semantic competence track whatever facts there are about meaning? The problem here is that all of the factors that appear to be relevant to the answer are ostensibly the same in w 1 as in w 2 : the linguistic behaviour is underpinned by precisely the same kind of cognitive mechanism in both worlds, and ex hypothesi the metaphysical story about meaning is the same in both 19 What are the relevant respects? I mean that speakers in w 1 and w 2 would not notice anything unusual in the linguistic behaviour of the speakers in w 2 and w 1 respectively. Let us, then, turn to the third line of response that I shall consider. The cognitivist might look to adopt a solution to the liar paradox that endorses a T-sentence:
(T λ ′′) "λ is not true" is true ↔ λ is not true, but involves a revision of logic and the introduction of a non-standard conditional (whose associated biconditional I represent with "↔") to block the subsequent derivation of a contradiction. 22 The idea for the cognitivist would be roughly as follows: the cognised semantic theory yields the T-sentence (T λ ′′) for λ; the logic and conditional are such that the derivation of an explicit contradiction from (T λ ′′) is blocked; thus, even given the premise that λ = "λ is not true", the cognised semantic theory is consistent and may coherently be deemed correct.
Whatever merits such a theory of truth has, the cognitivist cannot adopt it as straightforwardly as she might hope. The cognitivist would have to argue that the output of the semantic module, given (a representation of) λ as input, is (T λ ′′) as opposed to (T λ ). Notice that this is not obviously a substantial change of commitment in terms of the meaning of λ: both T-sentences might be said to characterise λ as having the truth-condition that λ is not true. It is, in the first instance, the logic and the conditional of the metalanguage that have been changed. However, this is a substantial commitment: the semantic theory that yields (T λ ′′) is a different semantic theory to that which yields (T λ ). And, as Larson and Segal tell us,
[…] what semantic theory a person knows is a question for science, a matter of determinate empirical fact. This means that even if we discover a number of interpretive T theories, all successfully predicting the various kinds of speaker judgments discussed above, at most one of these can be the theory actually internalized by the speaker. (1995:
56-7)
The challenge for the cognitivist, then, is to explain why we should think that the relevant output of the semantic module is (T λ ′′) as opposed to (T λ ).
How the cognitivist might attempt to meet this challenge is an interesting question that I cannot discuss in any detail here. But let me express a general concern that I have about the prospects for meeting the challenge. Arguably the most developed solution to the liar paradox along the lines 22 Field's (2008) paracomplete theory of truth is an important and highly sophisticated example: it involves the adoption of a third truth value, and the semantics for its conditional are given by a transfinitely-iterated revision procedure which need not concern us here.
discussed here is that of Field (2008) . Consider now the following four points. First, Field's theory or truth is significantly more sophisticated, subtle and intricate than a straightforwardly inconsistent semantic theory that yields (T λ ). Second, a principal strength of Field's solution is that it validates the intersubstitutability of "…" and "'…' is true", and by the logical strength of the resulting system (cf.
McGee 2010: 422f). Third, all else being equal, and given the high costs of cognitive resources, we would expect there to be a preference for the cognised semantic theory to be simple, rather than sophisticated, subtle and intricate. Fourth, neither the valid intersubstitutability of "…" and "'…' is true", nor the logical strength of Field's system, are even relevant to the question of which semantic theory is cognised: the function of the semantic module is to interpret the words, complex expressions and sentences of the speaker's language, and, given the availability of canonical derivation procedures for inconsistent semantic theories, issues of validity and logical strength are beside the point. The upshot is that, even if the cognitivist explains how the relevant output of the semantic module is (T λ ′′)
as opposed to (T λ ), there is unlikely to be any reason to think that the relevant output actually is (T λ ′′) rather than (T λ ). The incorporation into the cognised semantic module of any such (non-classical) solution to the liar paradox constitutes a substantial empirical hypothesis that, it seems, there would be little reason to endorse.
We now turn to responses that seek to deny that the truth of the inconsistency hypothesis would be a problem for cognitivism.
"The truth of the inconsistency hypothesis would not be a problem"
Suppose that the inconsistency hypothesis is true: the cognised semantic theory yields (T λ ), from which a contradiction can be derived. Given this supposition, how might the cognitivist respond? In this subsection, I shall consider three options: the inconsistency theories put forward by Douglas Patterson (2009 Patterson ( , 2012 and Matti Eklund (2002 Eklund ( , 2005 , and then the adoption of a broadly Kripkean (1975) approach to the liar paradox.
Before I begin, however, let me very briefly mention dialetheism. 23 The cognitivist may accept that, despite being inconsistent, (T λ ) is in fact true. On this view, it follows that both λ is true and λ is not true; triviality may be avoided by commitment to a nonclassical, paraconsistent logic that deems ex falso quodlibet invalid. My main concern about this line of response is the independent coherence and plausibility of dialetheism -a matter that has been discussed at length elsewhere, and that I shall not discuss here. 24 But I note that, if the cognitivist is forced to adopt dialetheism, this would constitute a significant increase in the logical and metaphysical baggage that accompanies
cognitivism. In what follows, I put dialetheism aside.
23 See e.g. Priest 2006. 24 See e.g. the papers in Priest, Beall and Armour-Garb 2005. 16 So let us consider so-called "inconsistency theories". Very roughly, the inconsistency theorist claims in response to the liar paradox that our understanding of natural language is, in one way or another, inconsistent. I will focus first on Douglas Patterson's (2009 Patterson's ( , 2012 inconsistency theory, and then on that of Matti Eklund (2002 Eklund ( , 2005 . 25 Patterson's inconsistency theory involves a commitment to the neo-Davidsonian account of semantic competence and, in essence, our inconsistency hypothesis. He claims that understanding a natural language is sharing with other speakers cognition of a truth conditional semantic theory for that language which the paradoxes show to be logically false. (2009: 413) He draws the somewhat surprising conclusion that all of the sentences of natural language lack truth conditions and are meaningless. The idea is that we should make do with just the neo-Davidsonian account of semantic competence, and attempt to explain the relevant linguistic phenomena without recourse to linguistic meaning. For example, it is plausibly a linguistic phenomenon that, in English, one does not make a mistake in drawing inferences according to some rules:
(P) X and Y Therefore:
while one does make a mistake in drawing inferences according to others:
There is a natural explanation of this phenomenon: some rules, including the first but not the second, are valid. However, insofar as we think that validity is a matter of truth preservation, this explanation "'…' is true" and "…" are inter-deducible where "…" is replaced by a sentence of English, may be a meaning-constitutive principle for the English truth predicate. In particular, for Eklund, the following instance is a meaning-constitutive principle for the English truth predicate:
(13) "'λ is not true' is true" and "λ is not true" are inter-deducible.
Eklund thus claims that semantic competence with the truth predicate involves a disposition to accept (13). It does not matter for this story that some competence dispositions may be overridden (by, say, one's knowledge that (13) leads straightforwardly to a contradiction). Semantic competence does not require one to accept (13) when faced with it: competence dispositions may be masked.
Eklund tells us that the semantic values of terms are fixed roughly as follows.
When the conditions laid down by the meaning-constitutive principles can be satisfied, Here, which semantic values come closest to satisfying the meaning-constitutive principles is not just a matter of how many meaning-constitutive principles come out true; some of the principles may be more important than others, depending on, say, how deeply they are entrenched or how often the corresponding disposition is manifested. For more details, see Eklund 2002: 263-266. 19 The cognitivist might adopt Eklund's inconsistency theory by stipulating that the cognised semantic theory fixes the meaning-constitutive principles for the terms of the speaker's language. The natural thought here is to identify the meaning-constitutive principles with the canonical theorems of the semantic theory. Then, the semantic values of terms of a language would be fixed as whatever assignment comes closest -in Eklund's sense -to making the canonical theorems of the semantic theory come out true.
I have three brief concerns about adopting Eklund's strategy in this way. First, it seems likely to yield quite significant semantic indeterminacy. It is well-known that semantic theories of the form we are discussing require more than truth in order to adequately pin down the meaning of terms.
(There are difficulties, for example, distinguishing between the extensionally equivalent terms "renate" and "chordate"; and what will be the semantic value of abstract terms such as "justice"?) As the issue is well-known, I shall not expand upon it here.
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Second, it becomes unclear on this story what exactly is the point of positing linguistic meaning. For the cognitivist adopting Eklund's inconsistency theory: the meaning of each term will likely be construed as consisting of the T-sentences in which the term is mentioned; and the semantic values of terms of the language would be fixed as whatever comes closest to making the relevant Tsentences true. But it is unclear that the meaning, so construed, has any particular role to play in how we use language: it is the interpretation assigned by the cognised semantic theory, as opposed to whatever assignment comes closest to making the T-sentences true, which governs our linguistic behaviour. Moreover, it is not clear that Eklund's notion of meaning has any normative import: for Eklund, if we change our competence dispositions then we simply cease to have semantic competence with the relevant terms. It is unclear what theoretical role Eklund's notion of meaning would play.
Third, it is unclear that the cognitivist even can adopt Eklund's inconsistency theory. Eklund relies on (13) being a meaning-constitutive principle. But principles such as (13) concern putative logical relations between sentences of English, whereas the canonical theorems of the cognised semantic theory (and T-sentences in particular) are most naturally construed as relating expressions of English to the world. To put the point more simply: (13) names two English sentences, whereas Tsentences such as (T λ ) name one English sentence. The cognitivist should explain how (13) comes out as meaning-constitutive.
Perhaps the cognitivist can ameliorate these worries. But, at the very least, she would need to say a great deal more in order to adopt Eklund's inconsistency theory. For now, however, let us turn to the third and final line of response: adopting a broadly Kripkean approach to the liar paradox.
In its simple form, cognitivism says that the cognised semantic theory is correct. But, perhaps, in light of the liar paradox, it is in fact a subtheory that is correct. There may be a class of T-sentences yielded by the cognised semantic theory that the cognitivist can isolate as pathological and then 28 See e.g. Davidson 1976 Davidson , 1977 20 reject. A natural way to follow this line is to adopt a broadly Kripkean approach to the liar paradox.
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The approach involves giving a recursive, partial definition of truth for a language whose pathological -or, better, ungrounded -sentences are deemed not to have truth values. 30 At a very intuitive level, we can understand the ungrounded sentences as those that do not connect up with the world in the right way (whatever that is) to obtain a truth value. Crucially, on all formal accounts of groundedness, the liar sentence is an example of an ungrounded sentence.
The picture would be roughly as follows. First, when a sentence is grounded, its truth condition is that assigned by the cognised semantic theory. Second, when a sentence is ungrounded, it lacks a truth value and thus, presumably, it lacks a truth condition. However, the cognised semantic theory nonetheless yields a T-sentence for that sentence: consequently the T-sentence is incorrect (and the cognised semantic theory taken as a whole is incorrect). Third, in order to make sense of the compositionality of language, we would like to retain the axioms of the cognised semantic theory.
However, we cannot simply deem the axioms correct, as we can derive from them the incorrect Tsentences. Instead, the cognitivist might restrict the range of quantification in suitable axioms, deeming the restricted axiom set correct. I shall not discuss here how the cognitivist should perform the restriction, but assume for the sake of argument that it can be done.
There are, once again, difficulties facing this line of response. 31 Consider first just metaphysical cognitivism. In taking this line, it would be natural for the metaphysical cognitivist to claim that the semantic module metaphysically determines the truth conditions of grounded sentences.
However, this presupposes that there is already an established division between the grounded and ungrounded sentences. But groundedness, it seems, is to be determined in part by meaning and in part by the world. So, if "the sentence on the whiteboard is not true" is ungrounded, it is in part because it means that the sentence on the whiteboard is not true, and in part because the world is such that the (only) sentence on the whiteboard is "the sentence on the whiteboard is not true". If this is right, then there must be a notion of meaning that is metaphysically prior to the truth conditions assigned by the semantic module. Let us call this thin-meaning. Now, I shall not say anything about what thin-meaning might amount to -this is a task for the metaphysical cognitivist adopting this line of response. But I note that, in order to maintain that the semantic module metaphysically determines meaning, the metaphysical cognitivist must explain how the semantic module metaphysically determines thin-meaning. This is unlikely to be an easy task: 30 Some variants of the Kripkean approach to the liar paradox, such as Maudlin's (2004) , treat ungrounded sentences as possessing a third truth value, rather than as lacking a truth value. This issue need not concern us here. 31 There are additional difficulties, not discussed here, which I raise in Pinder forthcoming: §4.
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semantic theories of the form we are considering assign to sentences only truth-conditional content.
The metaphysical cognitivist who adopts this line of response would have to spell out a principled way to extract thin-meaning -whatever she says that it is -from a cognised semantic theory that only assigns truth-conditional content to sentences.
There is a more general version of the worry, which faces both metaphysical and material cognitivism. Which solution to the liar paradox is the correct solution (if indeed there is one) is, in part, a matter of linguistic meaning. We have considered solutions that deem the truth predicate to be context sensitive, that employ non-standard conditionals, and that treat meaning as (in some way) encoding inconsistency. On the Kripkean approach to the liar paradox, substantial hypotheses are offered about the extension of the truth predicate, the limited role of truth-conditional content, and a presumably semantic property of groundedness possessed by some sentences and not others.
Ultimately, however, the cognitivist claims that linguistic meaning is determined by the cognitive mechanism that underpins semantic competence. But, on both the metaphysical and material varieties, we lack a clear picture of how those cognitive mechanisms determine the particular meanings that terms must have for a particular solution to the liar paradox to be correct. So, if the cognitivist claims that ungrounded sentences lack the truth-conditional content assigned to them by the semantic module, then this is a decision that she has made. It is a decision about the meaning of sentences which, as far as we can tell, is simply not reflected by the cognitive mechanism that underpins semantic competence. As such, on this line of response, linguistic meaning seems to outstrip the canonical theorems of the cognised semantic theory.
The upshot is this. If the cognitivist adopts the Kripkean approach to the liar paradox, then:
some of the T-sentences yielded by the cognised semantic theory are incorrect, and there are aspects of linguistic meaning that are not reflected in the cognised semantic theory. Being cognised would thus be neither necessary, nor sufficient, for linguistic meaning.
To adopt the Kripkean approach to liar paradox, then, the cognitivist needs to say a great deal more. an account of the epistemic relation between the so-determined linguistic meaning and semantic module; this may not be trivial because, as noted, there may be aspects of linguistic meaning that outstrip the cognised semantic theory. Third, she should explain why the Kripkean approach to the liar paradox is the correct approach. I make no claim that the cognitivist cannot fill in the details -but the details would most certainly need to be given.
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Concluding remarks
The liar paradox poses a serious difficulty to the cognitivist account of meaning. There is evidence to suggest that, due to the paradox, the cognised semantic theory is inconsistent. This contradicts, on its natural construal, the cognitivist account of meaning. I have discussed a number of lines of response to the difficulty. Although they have not all been ruled out by our discussion, it is clear that a great deal of work would be required to show that any of them can overcome the difficulty.
An observation that has underpinned much of the discussion is this: the principal theoretical role of the cognised semantic theory gives us reason to think that the cognised semantic theory does not encode a solution to the liar paradox. I think that it is from this observation that the difficulties arise: if the cognised semantic theory does not encode a solution to the liar paradox, then there are likely to be problems using it to determine the correct semantic theory.
This observation, though, threatens to generalise. In particular, any account of meaning that ties the correct semantic theory too tightly to our linguistic dispositions or intuitions will, I think, face similar problems. The reason that the liar paradox is so difficult to solve is that there are individual claims or principles that we are disposed to treat as true, but that are jointly inconsistent. This is likely to be reflected in the cognitive and causal mechanisms that underpin those dispositions, and by our linguistic behaviour more generally. In light of the liar paradox, a great deal of care must be taken in giving, in terms such as these, an account of literal, linguistic meaning.
